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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would be to treat the personal nature of the article as establishing
prima facie a reasonable expectation of forum consequences once the
defective product is placed in the mainstream of commerce.
CPLR 308(4): Both timely nailing and mailing required to toll statute
of limitations.
Where a natural person is to be served with process but such
service cannot be made upon the defendant personally, CPLR 308
provides for "substituted" means.71 After reasonable attempts have
been made to effect in-hand delivery or mail and delivery service in
accordance with subparagraphs (1) and (2) of CPLR 308, a plaintiff
may resort to "nail and mail" service pursuant to 308(4).72 Two steps
are contemplated by this form of service. First, the summons must be
attached to the door of the defendant's actual place of business, dwell-
ing or usual abode.78 Second, a copy of the summons must be mailed
to the defendant's last known residence. Failure to perform either step
will result in lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. 74
71 CPLR 308 has been deemed to provide for a "hierarchy of alternative means of
service, in which the primary place is given to the delivery of process to the defendant
in person." Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 502, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457, 289 N.Y.S.2d
161, 170 (1968). See generally 1 WK&M J 308.01-.02a.
72 CPLR 308 provides in part:
Personal service upon a natural person shall be made by any of the following
methods:
1. by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served; or
2. by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age
and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or actual abode
of the person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to be
served at his last known residence ....
When a plaintiff, using due diligence, has exhausted the possibility of service under the
above subparagraphs, he may then proceed, without court order, to employ the nail and
mail form of service
by affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of business, dwell-
ing place or usual place of abode within the state of the person to be served
and by mailing the summons to such person at his last known residence ....
Id. 308(4). The affidavit of service, filed with the clerk of the court following the 308(4)
service, must set forth the details, including dates and hours, of the efforts made to
serve the defendant personally, in order to show that the plaintiff has acted with due
diligence. Blatz v. Benschine, 53 Misc. 2d 352, 354-55, 278 N.YS2d 533, 536 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967) (mem.); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 636, 248
N.Y.S2d 494, 498 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 823, 258 N.Y.S.2d
376 (4th Dep't 1965) (mem.).
73 The "nailing" obligation requires that the summons be affixed to a place where
the defendant in fact resides or works. While the "mailing" requirement may be satisfied
by mailing to the last known address of the defendant, the service will be vitiated upon
proof that the nailing was to a place where the defendant no longer lives or works.
Polansky v. Paugh, 23 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Ist Dep't 1965) (per curiam);
Entwistle v. Stone, 53 Misc. 2d 227, 278 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967)
(mem.); Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966)
(mem.).
74 See Mittelman v. Mittelman, 45 Misc. 2d 445, 447-48, 257 N.Y.S.2d 86, 88-89 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1965), cited in 7B McKmNEY's CPLR 308, commentary at 209 (1972).
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In Furey v. Milgrom,75 the plaintiff, injured in an auto collision,
attempted to serve the defendant personally on five separate occasions
prior to the running of the three-year statute of limitations. 6 On the
last day within the statutory period, the process server, purporting to
comply with GPLR 308(4), affixed a copy of the summons and com-
plaint to the door of the defendant's residence. On the following day,
he mailed another copy to the same address. The Appellate Division,
Second Department, finding the affixation of process in itself insuffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations, dismissed the action as time-
barred. The court reasoned that a holding to the contrary would
subvert the legislative intent to require two separate acts of equal
standing - nailing and mailing - in order to insure receipt of notice
by the defendant and confer jurisdiction upon the court.77 In addition,
the court expressed concern that a contrary holding "would leave in
high uncertainty whether the act of mailing would be effective, even if
accomplished more than one day after the statute of limitations had
run."78
The factual situation presented in Furey is particularly problem-
atic in that it involves the conjunction of the method of substituted
service with the running of the statute of limitations. The CPLR pro-
vides, as a general rule, that "[t]he time within which an action must
be commenced . . . is computed from the time the cause of action
accrued to the time the claim is interposed."79 A claim is interposed
(and the statute of limitations is tolled) when the defendant is served
with summons.80 Although mere attaching of the summons to the house
of the defendant might satisfy constitutional due process require-
ments,8' the New York Legislature, in its prescription for service under
75 44 App. Div. 2d 91, 353 N.Y.S.2d 508 (2d Dep't 1974).
76 In the case of a motor vehicle accident within the state involving a New York
plaintiff and a nonresident defendant, section 253 of the Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law
offers an alternate means of service. Under this section, the nonresident motorist is
deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as his agent for service of process. See
notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra. Since the defendant in Furey was a resident
of New York, this statutory aid was unavailable to the plaintiff. Consequently, the plain-
tiff's only recourse was personal service pursuant to CPLR 308.
7744 App. Div. 2d at 93, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
78 Id.
79 CPLR 203(a).
80 CPLR 203(b)(1).
81 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), wherein
the Supreme Court, in discussing the validity of substituted service, stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.... The notice must be
1975]
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the CPLR, has gone beyond the bare constitutional minimum. 2
CPLR 308(4) specifically requires nailing and mailing of the summons;
therefore, according to the Furey court, only upon the performance
of both acts may the claim be deemed interposed.
A shortcoming in the Furey decision, however, lies in the court's
incorrect reference to completion of service.88 The court sought to
determine "at what time service was complete,"' 4 yet CPLR 308(4)
specifically sets this time at ten days after the filing of proof of service.
It would have been more accurate for the court to speak in terms of
when the claim is interposed. The holding of the case implies this was
the intention of the court, but the misuse of terminology is imprecise
and confusing.
Furey may be further criticized since the court failed to satisfac-
torily consider and distinguish other cases which have held the statute
of limitations to be tolled upon due execution of the first of two re-
quired services. For example, the court omitted any reference to Chem-
Trol Pollution Services, Inc. v. Ingraham,5 an Article 78 proceeding
wherein service upon both the Commissioner of Health and the At-
torney General was required. The Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment, held that the timely service upon the Commissioner tolled the
statute of limitations although service upon the Attorney General was
not effected until after the period of limitations had expired.88 While
Furey appears to be in conflict with Chem-Trol,17 a valid basis exists
for the disparate holdings. In Chem-Trol, the court found a specific
statutory justification for its decision. The court held that the Com-
missioner and the Attorney General were sufficiently united in interest
of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, . . . and it
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance ....
Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
82 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 308, commentary at 209 (1972), wherein Dean Joseph
M. McLaughlin cautions:
The plaintiff must bear in mind not only that fair notice is required but also
that the CPLR must be complied with. Thus, even though the defendant receives
actual notice through service of summons by mail, a valid service under CPLR
308(4) requires that a second copy of the summons be served. One step without
the other- while perhaps constitutional -fails to comply with the statute and
will not result in jurisdiction [citation omitted].
83 44 App. Div. 2d at 92, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 509. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 203, supp.
commentary at 14 (1974). Dean McLaughlin notes:
It seems clear that when the court sought to determine when service "was com-
plete," it was not using that phrase as a term of art. Unhappily, at no time does
the court define its use of the phrase, and it is unclear from the opinion what
was intended ....
Id.
84 44 App. Div. 2d at 92, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
85 42 App. Div. 2d 192, 345 N.Y.S.2d 714 (4th Dep't 1973).
86 Id. at 194, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
87 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 203, supp. commentary at 14 (1974).
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so that, pursuant to CPLR 203(b), proper service upon one would be
effective as to both for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.88
The court in Furey did consider cases arising under the nonresi-
dent motorist statute,8 9 which requires that a plaintiff serve one copy
of the summons upon the Secretary of State and mail a second copy
to the defendant. 0 In such a case, personal service upon the Secretary
of State has been held sufficient to toll the running of the statute.91
However, as noted in Furey, this result occurs since the Secretary of
State has been statutorily designated the agent of the nonresident
defendant for service of process.92 Consequently, service upon the
Secretary tolls the running of the statute of limitations in the same
manner as would personal service upon the nonresident within the
state.93 It is noteworthy, however, that one commentator has argued
that the presence or absence of such agency relationship should in no
way affect the ultimate result.94
Significantly, both Chem-Trol and the class of cases arising under
the nonresident motorist statute involved situations where there were
two parties to be served. Not only had service been accomplished in
accordance with the statutory mandate as to the party served, but
there was additional statutory authority present in Chem-TroP5 for
holding that service sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. On
the other hand, Furey involved a situation where only one party was
to be served. CPLR 308(4) specifically requires the performance of
two separate acts of service as to that one defendant. Therefore, where
only one act is performed prior to the running of the statute, no one
has been validly served under the definition of the statute, and, there-
fore, no claim has been interposed.
Admittedly, the result in Furey is a harsh one,96 and the reasoning
8842 App. Div. 2d at 194, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 716. CPLR 203(b) carves out certain ex-
ceptional cases where a claim may be deemed interposed before a summons is served on
the defendant. One such instance is where service has been timely made against a party
united in interest with the defendant. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Stone, 270 N.Y. 154, 200
N.E. 679 (1936).
89 N.Y. VEH. & Tr". LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970).
0Old.
91 See Sadek v. Stewart, 38 App. Div. 2d 655, 327 N.YS.2d 271 (3d Dep't 1971) (mer.),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 768, 771 (1972); Dominion of
Canada Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pierson, 27 App. Div. 2d 484, 280 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dep't 1967);
Glines v. Muszynski, 15 App. Div. 2d 435, 225 N.Y.S.2d 61 (4th Dep't 1962) (per curiam).
9244 App. Div. 2d at 93, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
93Id.
94 See 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 203, supp. commentary at 15 (1974).
95 See id. at 14.
98 As Dean McLaughlin has pointed out:
When two services are required to obtain jurisdiction, the first service is just as
likely as the second to give notice to the defendant that the action is being
1975]
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offered by the opinion alone would not appear to warrant so strong a
holding. However, in the absence of statutory authority to the con-
trary, the intent of the legislature seems clear that in order to inter-
pose a claim against a defendant by means of substituted service
under CPLR 308(4), literal compliance with both of the required acts
of service must be achieved. As the court noted, a holding that nailing
alone would effectively toll the statute of limitations would relegate
the second act of mailing to a position of very minor importance T7
Perhaps an even more serious consideration is the practical difficulty
which would result from a contrary holding in this case. No time
limit for performance of the second act of service would exist and the
courts would be faced with the problem of determining in each case
the effectiveness of the later service. 8 Such important procedural
issues should not be left to determination on an ad hoc basis.
CPLR 327: Court of Appeals dismisses on the ground of forum non
conveniens suit arising from an accident occurring in New York.
Prior to Silver v. Great American Insurance Co.,99 New York
maintained an inflexible forum non conveniens doctrine.100 For ex-
ample, as a result of the Court of Appeals' decision in De La Bouillerie
v. De Vienne,101 New York courts were required to retain jurisdiction
over foreign torts if either party was a New York resident. 10 2 This rigid
commenced . .. (and] . .. it is usually the defendant's conduct which forces
the plaintiff to use a double-edged service ....
Id. at 15.
It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff may avail himself of the sixty-day
extension period pursuant to CPLR 203(b)(5). See H. WAcHT'u, Naw YoRK PRArCE
UNDER THE CPLR 76 (4th ed. 1973), wherein the author states:
If the statute of limitations is about to run out, the plaintiff can automatically
gain an additional sixty days beyond the statutory period within which to serve
the defendant or commence service by publication. This is accomplished in an
action in a court of record by delivering the summons to the sheriff of the
county where the defendant resides, is employed or is doing business; or, if these
are not known after reasonable inquiry, to the sheriff of the county where the
defendant is known to have last resided, been employed or been engaged in
business.
97 44 App. Div. 2d at 93, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
98 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
929 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E2d 619, 328 N.Y.S2d 398 (1972).
100 For a discussion of the development of the forum non conveniens doctrine in
New York, see The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 561, 588 (1972).
101 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N. 15 (1949).
102 De La Bouillerie involved an action by a nonresident plaintiff against New York
defendants for false imprisonment and conspiracy to defraud. These charges arose from
activities carried on by the defendants in France. The defendants moved under CPA
107, the forerunner of CPLR 3211, to dismiss the action on the ground that France
represented the proper forum for this suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's dismissal, because of a failure to consider the residence of the parties. Id. at 61,
89 N.E. at 15. In De La Bouillerie, Chief Judge Loughran reiterated the traditional
[Vol. 49:576
